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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early months of 2009, the United States faced the worst economic
crisis since the Great Depression.' Recent events indicate that this dire outlook is
more than hyperbole. Stock prices have recently seen a dramatic decline.2 In
February 2009, the Dow Jones hit a twelve-year low.3 In December 2008, the
unemployment rate hit a sixteen-year high.4 The year 2008 also saw consumer
spending at its lowest rates in twenty-eight years.! This economic climate has
forced a number of retailers to file for bankruptcy.' Unfortunately, financial woes
have not been limited to the retail sector; the crisis has deeply impacted the
financial services sector as well.7
President Barack Obama has expressed that financial markets are in
desperate need of reform." To this end, pension fund reform should be
1. See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, Measuring a Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, at AI (reporting
that President Barack Obama has "regularly suggested" that the current economic crisis "could rival the Great
Depression").
2. See Jeff Sommer, Even for Market Veterans, It's Uncharted Territory, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at
B6 (reporting that, in the first two months of 2009, the Dow Jones industrial average had fallen almost twenty
percent).
3. Jack Healy, Buyers Flee as S. &P. and Dow Hit 12-Year Lows, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009, at B 1.
4. Jeannine Aversa, Jobless Rate Jumps to 7.2 Percent in December, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 9,
2009, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_1 1414125?source=rss.
5. Jeannine Aversa, Economy Shrinks at Fastest Rate in 26 Years, Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 9, 2009,
http://www.impomag.comScripts/ShowPR.aspRID=10664&CommonCount=0 (on file with McGeorge Law
Review).
6. E.g., Stephanie Rosenbloom, Circuit City Going Out of Business, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at B I
("Last year, a raft of retailers, including Boscov's, Sharper Image, Mervyns, Linens 'n Things, Whitehall
Jewelers and Steve & Barry's, filed for bankruptcy protection. This week, Goody's Family Clothing and
Gottschalks also filed. Many more retailers are expected to follow suit as they run out of working capital or are
unable to refinance their debt.").
7. See David Olive, The Year the Music Stopped: The Roller-Coaster That Was 2008 Brought Financial
Giants and Everyday Investors Alike to Their Knees, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 26, 2008, at BOI (reporting that in
2008 "some of the most storied names in high finance," including "Merrill Lynch & Co., Lehman Bros.
Holdings Inc., [and] Bear Steams Cos.," became "so racked with losses they had no choice but to surrender
their independence in mergers with stronger entities").
8. See Michael Powell & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Casts Wide Blame for Financial Crisis and Proposes
Homeowner Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2008, at A19 ("Senator Barack Obama called Thursday for tighter
regulation of mortgage lenders, banks and financial houses, even as he spoke of pumping $30 billion into the
economy to shield homeowners and local governments from the worst effects of the collapse of the housing
bubble.").
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considered, since "[p]ension funds hold a staggering amount of assets. ' 9
Congress has repeatedly recognized the importance of ensuring that pension
plans are stable and secure.'° The most notable piece of legislation advancing this
goal is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)."
Congress enacted ERISA to ensure that workers are not twice-stricken by the
tragedies of losing both their jobs and pension funds in the event that their
employer goes out of business.'2 However, since employees are permitted to
invest their 401(k) pensions in their employer's stock, the danger that American
workers can suddenly be thrown into complete financial disarray still remains.1
3
Commentators have proposed a wide variety of reforms to 401(k) pensions,
including: limiting the amount of stock that can be invested in employee 401(k)
plans,' 4 an outright ban on the use of the employer's stock in 401(k) plans,"
requiring that an employer's communications to its employees regarding the
employer's stock be disclosed to the SEC, 16 scrutinizing the use of the employer's
stock for compliance with the employer's fiduciary duties,' 7 requiring that an
employer provide its employees with investment advice,'8 and mandating that
employers provide a pre-selected investment package as a "default" investment
option for their employees. ,9
This Comment proposes that two amendments to Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) section 401(k) are needed in order to protect employee pension
9. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 1168 (6th ed. 2007).
10. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a) (West 2008) ("The Congress finds that.., the continued well-being
and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by [employee benefit] plans;
that they are affected with a national public interest; [and] that they have become an important factor affecting
the stability of employment and the successful development of industrial relations."); see also 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 5201 (West Supp. 2009) ("[One of the] purposes of this chapter [is] ... to ensure that such authority and such
facilities are used in a manner that ...protects home values, college funds, retirement accounts, and life
savings.").
11. Lorraine Schmall, Defined Contribution Plans After Enron, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 891, 893 (2003).
12. Sharon Reece, Enron: The Final Straw & How to Build Pensions of Brick, 41 DuQ. L. REV. 69, 69
(2002).
13. See Shlomo Benartzi et al., The Law and Economics of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, 50 J.L. &
ECON. 45, 45 (2007) (stating that, because sixty-two percent of Enron's 401(k) plan consisted of Enron stock,
the company's collapse decimated Enron's employees' retirement fund).
14. See, e.g., Pension Protection and Diversification Act of 2001, S. 1838, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2001)
(proposing to cap the amount of the employer's stock that could be held in a 401(k) plan at twenty percent of
the plan's assets).
15. Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security Privatization, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 53,
78 (2004).
16. Jennifer O'Hare, Misleading Employer Communications and the Securities Fraud Implications of
the Employee as Investor, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1217, 1237-39 (2003).
17. Dana M. Muir, The U.S. Culture of Employee Ownership and 401(k) Plans, 14 ELDER L.J. 1, 10
(2006).
18. Janice Kay Lawrence, Pension Reform in the Aftermath of Enron: Congress' Failure to Deliver the
Promise of Secure Retirement to 401(k) Plan Participants, 92 KY. L.J. 1, 73 (2003).
19. Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged Stool of
Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV. 938, 981-82 (2007).
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investments. The first amendment to IRC section 401(k) should require that
pension plans contain a diversification component in order to qualify under the
section. The second amendment that this Comment advocates would restrict
401(k) pension plans from consisting of the employer's securities, particularly
the common stock.2 This Comment argues that both amendments are necessary
in order to respond to different weaknesses in the current 401(k) pension system.
While the diversification component responds to participants' lack of financial
savvy, the restriction on offering the employer's stock as an investment option
responds to the psychological difficulties that participants may have when
reconciling their role as "investors" with their duties as "employees."
In Part II, this Comment provides the historic and statutory background for
employer-sponsored pensions, outlining how ERISA and section 401 of the IRC
govern employee-sponsored pensions. In Part III, this Comment analyzes the
current weaknesses in 401(k) pension laws, highlighting employee needs that
must be addressed and employer interests that should be maintained. In Part IV,
this Comment discusses how the proposed reforms will correct the existing
weaknesses in 401(k) pension laws by addressing employees' educational,
psychological, and practical needs, which the current system ignores.
II. BACKGROUND OF PENSION'S HISTORY AND GOVERNING STATUTES
A. History and Purpose of Pension Funds
The concept of employees enjoying an extended retirement is relatively
recent.2' Pension advocates justified the need for pension funds for two reasons,
the first being to ensure that the elderly members of society have the means to
support themselves.2 The second goal of pension funds is to encourage older
23workers, who had declined in productivity, to voluntarily leave the company.
Following World War II, private pension plans gained in popularity, driven by
20. To be clear, this Comment is only arguing that employees should be banned from having their
401(k) accounts invested in their employer's stock. This Comment is not questioning the propriety of an
employee independently purchasing her employer's stock or the employer issuing stock options as part of a
benefit plan.
21. See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Private Pensions: Issues and Options, in AGENDA FOR THE
NATION 183, 183 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2003) ("In 1900, nearly two out of every three men aged sixty-five
or older were in the workforce."); see also F. Spencer Baldwin, Old Age Pension Schemes: A Criticism and a
Program, 24 Q.J. EcON. 713, 713 (1910) (discussing the creation of pensions in Europe and North America
during the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries).
22. Baldwin, supra note 21, at 714. Pensions are of critical importance to society, because without
pensions many elderly persons would be forced to rely on public assistance. Kaplan, supra note 15, at 80.
23. Baldwin, supra note 21, at 714 ("The establishment of pension systems has, therefore, been
proposed as a means of retiring employees at a reasonably early age and removing [the] handicap on
industry."). Workers who do not have adequate financial resources to retire may be forced to work indefinitely,
thereby decreasing the number of employment opportunities for younger workers. Kaplan, supra note 15, at 80.
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employers' desire to attract and retain high-quality employees. 24 Today, "[t]he
components of a financially secure retirement are often analogized to a three-
legged stool," with the "three legs representing three sources of retirement
income: (1) Social Security, (2) private pension plans, and (3) individual savings
and assets." '
Unfortunately, the three-legged stool appears to be built upon wobbly legs.
At least one commentator predicts that a calamity that threatens retirees'
economic future is looming.26 In the coming years, the number of retirees is
expected to grow much more rapidly than the number of taxpayers entering the
workforce.27 As a result, by 2017, Social Security payments are projected to
exceed the amount of incoming tax.28 By 2041, the Social Security Trust Fund is
projected to be completely exhausted. 29 Additionally, personal savings have
steadily dwindled over the past twenty years,3° and from 2001 to 2006,
"consumer debt grew approximately twice as fast as personal income .,,3' These
converging circumstances present a bleak outlook for retirees.
B. Types of Pension Plans
Pension plans come in two different varieties.32 The first type is the "defined
balance plan," which ERISA broadly defines as any type of pension plan that is
not a defined contribution plan.33 Traditionally, this type of plan "promises to pay
each participant a set amount of money as an annuity beginning at retirement.
34
24. Befort, supra note 19, at 947. Employers also implemented pension plans in an effort to dissuade
workers from joining labor unions. See ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 39 (14th ed. 2006) ("The large
corporations were strongholds of anti-unionism, both through traditional weapons and newly developing
benevolent personnel practices. 'Welfare capitalism' brought profit-sharing plans (usually short-lived), bonus
systems, more rational systems of hiring and discipline through more scientific personnel management, and
employee welfare plans that attempted to substitute 'company consciousness' for loyalty to craft.").
25. Befort, supra note 19, at 939.
26. Id. at 938.
27. Id. at 943-44.
28. Id. at 943.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 960.
31. Id.
32. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(34) (West 2008) (specifying the aspects of a "defined contribution plan");
29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(35) (West 2008) (defining the term "defined benefit plan"). "Cash balance plans" may be
considered a third type of pension plan. Under ERISA, cash balance plans are classified as a type of defined
benefit plan; however, these plans combine aspects of both traditional defined benefit plans and defined
contribution plans. Regina T. Jefferson, Striking a Balance in the Cash Balance Plan Debate, 49 BUFF. L. REV.
513, 518-19 (2001). This type of plan uses "hypothetical accounts" to determine participants' pension benefits.
See Hirt v. Equitable Ret. Plan, 533 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing the typical cash balance plan's
framework). Since this Comment will focus on 401(k) plan reform, cash balance plans will not be discussed
further.
33. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(35).
34. TWILA SLESNICK & JOHN C. SUTrLE, IRAs, 401(K)S, & OTHER RETIREMENT PLANS: TAKING YOUR
MONEY OUT 10 (8th ed. 2007).
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Payments are made "either as an exact dollar amount or as a calculated benefit
through a service and salary formula."35 Instead of maintaining individual
accounts, employers hold defined benefit plan assets together in a common
pool.3 6 While the employer is the plan's principle guarantor, the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation insures pension benefits in the event that a plan becomes
underfunded.37
The second type of pension plan, called a "defined contribution plan" or
"individual account plan,"38 consists of "plan[s] which provide[] for an individual
account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount
contributed to the participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and
losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be
allocated to such participant's account."39 This type of plan came into existence
in 1978, following amendments to the tax code.4 This plan works by having
either the plan participant or the employer "contribute pre-tax dollars to the
employee's individual account under the plan (sometimes at a set rate) and the
account is invested for the employee. 4' Many different types of defined
contribution plans exist, including, most notably for the purposes of this
Comment, 401(k) plans.42 When a participant retires, the participant receives the
value of his account. 3 In contrast to defined benefit plans, participants in defined
contribution plans are at full risk for any losses suffered.4
C. ERISA
1. ERISA 's Policy Aims
Prior to ERISA's passage, employers often designed pension plans as
conditional gifts, enabling employers to deny benefits to employees.43 For
example, in Dodge v. Board of Education, several groups of retired teachers filed
suit to recover pension benefits. 46 One group of teachers argued that the "Miller
Law," which stated that retired teachers would receive $1,500 annually, induced
35. Reece, supra note 12, at 77.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Izzarelli v. Rexene Prods. Co., 24 F.3d 1506, 1509 n.1 (5th Cir. 1994).
39. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(34)).
40. Schmall, supra note 11, at 899 ("Defined contribution plans had their genesis in the 1978
amendments to the tax code.").
41. Reece, supra note 12, at 78.
42. Id.
43. id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 71-72.
46. 302 U.S. 74, 77 (1937).
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the group to retire.47 Rather than find the plaintiffs had a vested right to the
$1,500, the United States Supreme Court refused to accept the plaintiffs
argument.48 The Court noted that in Illinois, acts relating to retirement benefits
"did not create contracts or vested rights and that the State was free to alter,
amend, and repeal such laws even though the effect of its action was to deprive
the pensioner or annuitant, for the future, of benefits then enjoyed. 4 9
Additionally, employers often abuse plan assets, resulting in retirees seeking
government assistance to make up the difference. ° For example, in 1963, 4,500
former Studebaker employees lost eighty-five percent of their pension benefits,
because Studebaker's pension plan contained insufficient assets.5' Thus,
[o]ne of Congress' central purposes in enacting [ERISA] was to prevent
the "great personal tragedy" suffered by employees whose vested
benefits are not paid when pension plans are terminated.... Congress
wanted to [ensure] that if a worker has been promised a defined pension
benefit upon retirement-and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are
required to obtain a vested benefit-he actually will receive it.
5 2
2. Duties Imposed by ERISA
ERISA sets out the procedures for administering pension plans.53 Pension
plans are protected "through a combination of prohibitions, disclosures, and
financial responsibilities aimed at providing security for employees and recourse
in the event the employer or other fiduciary violates the rules. 54 Plan
administrators are fiduciaries of the plan's beneficiaries.55 As such, section 404 of
ERISA imposes three duties upon plan administrators.56  First, a plan
administrator "shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries," taking special care to maximize
benefits and limit costs for the plan's beneficiaries.57 Second, a plan administrator
must act "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
47. Id. at 80.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Reece, supra note 12, at 72 ("Additionally, company abuses of plan assets and failure to protect
funds added to the probability that retirees would need to seek governmental assistance in old age.").
51. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 374 n.22 (1980).
52. Id. at 374-75.
53. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1107(d)(3)(A) (West 1999) ("The term 'eligible individual account plan' means an
individual account plan which is (i) a profit-sharing, stock bonus, thrift, or savings plan; (ii) an employee stock
ownership plan; or (iii) a money purchase plan which was in existence on September 2, 1974, and which on
such date invested primarily in qualifying employer securities.").
54. Reece, supra note 12, at 72.
55. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(21)(A) (West 2008).
56. Id. § 1104(a).
57. Id. § 1104(a)(l).
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then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like
aims." 8 Third, a plan administrator has a duty to diversify "the investments of the
plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it
is clearly prudent not to do so.''a9 Under section 409 of ERISA, fiduciaries who
breach their statutory duties may be held "personally liable to make good to such
plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach," as well as being
held liable under other equitable theories of relief.'
In addition to the previously-mentioned fiduciary duties, ERISA requires that
"a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries.'6 However, the majority of circuits have
held that "in general, an employer that decides to terminate, amend, or
renegotiate a plan does not act as a fiduciary, and thus cannot violate its fiduciary
duty. 62 In Izzarelli v. Rexene Products Company, Rexene Products Company
(Rexene) established a savings plan under which it would match participants'
voluntary contributions.63 In 1987, Rexene initially decided to contribute 101,794
shares to plan participants, based upon the amount of money each participant was
paid during 198 6 . 4 After Rexene announced this contribution plan, Rexene's
accountants realized that the plan would have resulted in an over-contribution, in
violation of the IRC.65 The plan needed to be changed, but the new share
contribution had to accomplish two goals. First, since Rexene was in the process
of being sold, the new contribution plan could not make the company less
attractive to buyers.66 Second, Rexene had to formulate a contribution plan that
would ensure that "heavy savers" would not frustrate Rexene's sale.67 Eventually,
in order to comply with over-contribution restrictions, Rexene decided to
"allocate to each participant shares valued at 6.32% of his or her 1986 considered
compensation., 68 "Rexene chose 6.32% because that percentage allowed it to
allocate shares up to the [Internal Revenue Code] limits of most of the heavy
savers." 69 Under this revised plan, the 1986 participants only received the
equivalent of 82,248 shares, not the 101,794 shares Rexene initially promised.7°
58. Id. § 1104(a)(l)(B).
59. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
60. Id. § 1109(a).
61. 29 U.S.C.A. § 104(a)(1) (West 2008) (emphasis added).
62. Izzarelli v. Rexene Prods. Co., 24 F.3d 1506, 1524 (5th Cir. 1994).
63. Id. at 1509 n.2.
64. Id. at 1509.
65. Id. at 1510.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Izzarelli, 24 F.3d at 1511.
69. Id. at 151l n.7.
70. Id. at 1512.
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The 1986 plan participants brought suit against Rexene, alleging, among
other things, breaches of fiduciary duty under ERISA. 7' The Izzarelli court faced
a situation where Rexene acted primarily out of self-interest, yet Rexene's share
contribution plan ultimately benefitted the plan as a whole.72 The court held that
"when an employer is also a fiduciary for its ERISA plans, it acts as a fiduciary
'only when and to the extent that [it] function[s] in [its] capacity as plan
administrator[], not when [it] conduct[s] business that is not regulated by
ERISA.' 73 Rexene acted as an employer, not as a fiduciary, when it amended its
contribution plan.74 Thus, Rexene's fiduciary duties were not breached.75
Courts have interpreted ERISA's fiduciary duties as requiring administrators
to act for the benefit of the pension plan, rather than for the benefit of any
716particular participant. For example, in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Russell, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached its fiduciary duties by
failing to timely pay the plaintiff her disability benefits.77 The Supreme Court
interpreted section 409 of ERISA as allowing recovery only if the plan, as
opposed to a specific individual, suffers harm.7' Thus, the plaintiff did not have a
right of action for a breach of fiduciary duties.79 Justice Stevens noted:
It is of course true that the fiduciary obligations of plan
administrators are to serve the interest of participants and beneficiaries
and, specifically, to provide them with the benefits authorized by the
plan. But the principal statutory duties imposed on the trustees relate to
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1523.
73. Id. at 1524 (quoting Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal
quotations marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original)). A second line of cases provides that "an
incidental benefit cannot 'legitimize' a fiduciary's improper (self-interested) motives." Id. at 1523 (citing Deak
v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 821 F.2d 572, 579-81 & n.12 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1005 (1988)).
74. Izzarelli, 24 F.3d at 1524-25.
75. Id. at 1525.
76. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985) ("A fair contextual reading of
[ERISA] makes it abundantly clear that its draftsmen were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan
assets, and with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than with the rights of an individual
beneficiary."); see also Izzarelli, 24 F.3d at 1523 ("Plaintiffs read [ERISA section 404] to require Rexene to
manage the Plan solely in the interest of 1986 Plan participants and their beneficiaries. But, a fiduciary's duty
'runs to the plan as a whole,' not to any individual beneficiary or group of beneficiaries."). But see In re
Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 420 F.3d 231, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that a subgroup of 401(k)
participants had standing to bring suit for breaches of fiduciary duty). In Schering-Plough, the plaintiffs
represented "[a]ll persons who were participants in or beneficiaries of the Savings Plan at any time between
July 29, 1998 and the present." Id. at 233. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached their fiduciary
duties "by continuing to offer the Company Stock Fund as one of the Savings Plan alternatives when they knew
that Schering's stock price was unlawfully and artificially inflated." Id. The Schering-Plough court
distinguished the instant case from Russell by reasoning that the Russell court did not foreclose on the
possibility of a subgroup of plan participants bringing suit for ERISA violations. Id. at 241.
77. Russell, 473 U.S. at 136-37.
78. Id. at 140.
79. Id. at 148.
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the proper management, administration, and investment of fund assets,
the maintenance of proper records, the disclosure of specified
information, and the avoidance of conflicts of interest.0
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan indicated that under certain
circumstances a person may bring suit under ERISA for an individualized injury
caused by plan administrators.8' But Justice Brennan agreed with the majority
that, in the case at hand, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under section
409.2
D. 401(k) Plans
Section 401(k) pension plans first came into existence as a provision of the
Revenue Act of 1978.83 Beginning in 1981, section 401(k) became subject to a
variety of IRS regulations and congressional revisions.s In August 1991, the
Internal Revenue Service issued a comprehensive set of final regulations."
Section 401(k) plans rose in popularity during the mid-1980s s6 This may be
due in part to the fact that, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of
direct benefit plans had failed.87 Furthermore, the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation "was depleted to the extent that all plans were jeopardized."" s
Congress intended the Revenue Act of 1978 to provide relief to employers by
allowing employers to make pension contributions with stock instead of
monetary funding. s
80. Id. at 142-43.
81. Id. at 151-53 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("To the extent the Court suggests that administrators might
not be fully subject to strict fiduciary duties to participants and beneficiaries in the processing of their claims
and to traditional trust-law remedies for breaches of those duties, I could not more strongly disagree .... The
legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended by § 404(a) to incorporate the fiduciary standards of
trust law into ERISA, and it is black-letter trust law that fiduciaries owe strict duties running directly to
beneficiaries in the administration and payment of trust benefits."). Although Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion suggests that ERISA should be governed by the principles of trust law, IRC section 401 does not apply
black letter trust law, even though the term "trust" is used within the statute. See Tavannes Watch Co., Inc. v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 176 F.2d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1949) ("'Trust' is not a term of art or a fixed content,
and its meaning for the purposes of [Internal Revenue Code section 165(a)] is not necessarily the same as under
state law or as under other sections of the Internal Revenue Code."). Thus, a "trust" established under IRC
section 401 does not need to comply with state trust laws. See id. ("It is thus not conclusive that originally the
parties decided not to set up what they called a 'trust,' for they were thinking of the payment of trustees' fees
and the accounting in court which would necessarily be required if a state-law 'trust' were established.").
82. Russell, 473 U.S. at 150 (Brennan, J., concurring).
83. Schmall, supra note 11, at 899.
84. Id. at 900.
85. Reece, supra note 12, at 82-83.
86. Id. at 83.
87. Schmall, supra note 11, at 901.
88. Id. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation provides minimum insurance to under-funded direct
benefit pension plans. Reece, supra note 12, at 77.
89. Schmall, supra note 11, at 901.
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Additionally, 401(k) plans gained popularity in response to a desire on the
part of employees for pension plans to grow at a faster rate than what traditional
defined benefit plans offered."' While 401(k) plans were originally intended to
merely supplement traditional pension plans, "the 401(k) now serves as a primary
source of retirement income for more than half of American families."9'
"Employees sought to maximize their retirement funds by assuming the risk of
the stock market and foregoing the security of defined benefit plans."92 Other
reasons that employees find 401(k) plans attractive include the fact that
participants can take "their money" with them if they change companies and that
401(k) plans are seen as being less exposed to employer modifications than
traditional pension plans.93
1. Statutory Background
Congress enacted section 401 of the IRC for two reasons: to ensure that
highly compensated employees were not using pension plans to shelter income
from taxation and to ensure that pension plans were not being used to favor
highly compensated employees at the cost of excluding other employees. 94 For
example, under section 401, "inequalities in vesting are discriminatory (even if
contributions are comparable) if they operate, alone or with eligibility
requirements, to effectively exclude so many employees from practical benefits
of the plan that its value to the employee group as a whole is illusory." 95
Section 401 lays out four basic requirements.96 First, contributions to the trust
must be made by the "employer, or employees, or both., 97 Second, the plan may
not be used for "purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of [the] employees
or their beneficiaries." 98 Third, the plan must meet minimum participation
90. Kara M. Klaas, Note, Left in the Dark: Sarbanes-Oxley and Corporate Abuse of 401(k) Plan
Blackout Periods, 29 J. CORP. L. 801, 803 (2004).
91. Id. at 804.
92. Id. at 803.
93. ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, at 1165.
94. United States v. Hall, 398 F.2d 383, 389 (8th Cir. 1968); see also McClintock-Trunkey Co. v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 217 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1954) ("As has repeatedly been observed by the
courts, the purpose of [Internal Revenue Code section 165(a)] was to insure that profit-sharing plans be
operated for the welfare of employees in general and to prevent the trust device from being used for the benefit
of shareholders; and to insure that it shall be impossible for any part of the corpus or income to be used for
purposes other than the exclusive benefit of employees."). Although McClintock-Trunkey refers to Internal
Revenue Code section 165(a), not section 401, "[s]ection 401 (a) was originally enacted as Section 162(a) of the
Revenue Act of 1942 ... [,] which substantially amended Section 165(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.... The
section was reenacted as 1954 Code Section 401(a) .. " Myron v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 590, 595 n.1
(C.D. Cal. 1974).
95. Hall, 398 F.2d at 390.
96. 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008).
97. Id. § 401(a)(1).
98. Id. § 401(a)(2).
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standards.99 Fourth, "the contributions or benefits provided under the plan
[cannot] discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees."' °
Tax liability attaches when a section 401(a)-qualified trust's funds are
distributed to the beneficiaries.'' Under section 401(k) of the IRC, profit-sharing
or stock bonus plans can be considered qualified trusts under section 401(a).'02 In
order to be considered a qualified cash or deferred arrangement under section
401(k), the employee must have the ability to elect whether the employer will
make contributions to the employee's trust account or make cash payments
directly to the employee.' 3 Second, the trust's proceeds cannot be released to the
employee, unless an event specified by statute has occurred.' °4 Third, employees
have a non-forfeitable right to their accounts' assets.' 5 Finally, employers cannot
set an excessive period of employment as a condition for participation.'°6
2. How 401(k) Plans Work
Although there is some variety among the types of 401(k) plans,' 7 the
traditional 401(k) plan allows participants to have some of their pay directed into
the account; participants do not pay income tax on this compensation until the
money is withdrawn from the account.' 8 Some employers encourage contribution
by matching employee investments.' °9 In order to encourage employees to invest
in the employer's stock, many companies only offer to match employee
contributions that are being used to purchase the employer's stock."°
Plan participants' ownership of pension assets is restricted by the employer,
as well as by government regulation."' For instance, prior to the passage of the
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Enron and most other companies did not allow
participants to sell company stock received as a matching contribution before the
99. Id. § 401(a)(3).
100. Id. § 401(a)(4).
101. Id. § 402(a).
102. 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(k)(l) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008).
103. Id. § 401(k)(2)(A).
104. See id. § 401(k)(2)(B) (stating that proceeds may be released to the participant if, for example, the
employment relationship ends, the participant reaches the age of 59.5, or there is an instance of employee
hardship).
105. Id. § 401(k)(2)(C).
106. See id. § 401(k)(2)(D) (stating that employers may not set "a period of service with the employer
(or employers) maintaining the plan extending beyond the period permitted under section 401 (a)(l)").
107. For instance, a Roth 401(k) plan differs from traditional 401(k) plans, because "the tax benefits for
Roth 401(k)s come when [the participant] take[s] distributions, which will be tax free so long as [the
participant] meet[s] certain requirements." SLESNICK & SvlrrLE, supra note 34, at 9.
108. Id. at 8.
109. Id.
110. Klaas, supra note 90, at 805.
111. Id. at 804.
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participant reached the age of 50. '12 Furthermore, "only 4% of plans let
participants immediately exchange matching contributions of company stock.""' 3
3. Reforms Following Enron's Collapse
Following Enron's collapse, members of Congress presented numerous bills
that would have reformed defined contribution plans." 4 One such bill would have
amended ERISA to prohibit a 401(k) plan from consisting of more than twenty
percent of the employer's stock."5 Another bill would have enabled an employer
to either allow the company's stock to be an investment option for plan
participants or make matching contributions in the form of company stock, but
employers could not have done both."6 However, the Bush Administration was
critical of attempts to limit the amount of the employer's stock held within a
401(k) plan."7 The Bush Administration argued that allowing employers to
contribute to 401(k) plans with company stock, instead of cash, places a less
onerous financial burden on the employer.' Therefore, "employers who are
precluded from making company stock matching contributions will respond by
not making any matching contributions or by not sponsoring any pension plan at
all.""' 9 Furthermore, some argue that any attempt to limit which investments an
employee voluntarily makes is overly-paternalistic.2
Eventually, Congress passed the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) to
respond to the need for 401(k) pension reform.'2 ' The PPA made two notable
changes to pension laws.'22 First, "[tihe PPA enable[d] plan participants to sell
any employer-directed company stock match at any time beyond three years of
receipt."'23 Second, the PPA carves out an exception to the ban on fiduciaries
112. Reece, supra note 12, at 84. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 now provides that employees must
be able to sell company stock received as a matching contribution within three years of receipt. 26 U.S.C.A. §
401(a)(35)(C) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008).
113. Reece, supra note 12, at 84 (quoting Christine Dugas, Energy Giant's Disaster Devastates 401(k)
Plans; Dabacle [sic] Shows Risk of Loading up on Employer's Stock, USA TODAY, Nov. 30,2001, at IB).
114. Befort, supra note 19, at 979.
115. Pension Protection and Diversification Act of 2001, S. 1838, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2001). Due to
insufficient support, the author eventually withdrew the bill. Muir, supra note 17, at 11.
116. Protecting America's Pensions Act of 2002, S. 1992, 107th Cong. § 101 (2002).
117. Befort, supra note 19, at 979; Lawrence, supra note 18, at 48-49.
118. Lawrence, supra note 18, at 49.
119. Befort, supra note 19, at 979; see also Lawrence, supra note 18, at 49 ("[O]pponents of overall
limitations argue that employers are less likely to make employer contributions in the form of cash.").
120. Befort, supra note 19, at 980. Section 401(k) plans are meant to allow employees "to maximize
their retirement funds by assuming the risk of the stock market and foregoing the security of defined benefit
plans." Klaas, supra note 90, at 803. Thus, any attempts to restrict investment freedoms for the sake of investor
protection would undercut this central policy.
121. Befort, supra note 19, at 980.
122. Id.
123. Id.; 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)(35)(C) (West Supp. 2008) ("In the case of a portion of the account
attributable to employer contributions other than elective deferrals which is invested in employer securities, a
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encouraging beneficiaries to make particular investments 24 by "provid[ing] a safe
harbor for fiduciary advisors, including interested financial service firms, who
give advice to participants on portfolio management, so long as they disclose
conflicts and base advice upon an independently approved computer model."'25
4. The Employer's Fiduciary Duties Related to 401(k) Plans
In general, 401(k) trustees are subject to ERISA's fiduciary and enforcement
rules.2 6 However, while ERISA provides that the employer's stock cannot make
up more than ten percent of a defined benefit plan's fair market value,'27 this
restriction does not apply to 401(k) plans.' 8 Furthermore, if a participant is able
to exercise control over her individual account assets, "no person who is
otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable under [ERISA section 404] for any loss, or
by reason of any breach, which results from such exercise of control.' 29 In other
words, a 401(k) plan's fiduciaries cannot be held liable for harm suffered as a
result of a participant's investment decisions, so long as the participant had the
power to exercise control over her account and the participant is free to invest in
a broad range of options.' 30
Some plaintiffs have alleged that the act of offering the employer's stock as
an investment option for a 401(k) plan results in a breach of the employer's
fiduciary duties.'' Faced with these claims, courts have held that, when
plan meets the requirements of this subparagraph if each applicable individual who-i) is a participant who has
completed at least 3 years of service ... may elect to direct the plan to divest any such securities and to reinvest
an equivalent amount in other investment options meeting the requirements of subparagraph (D).").
124. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1106(a) (West 1999).
125. Befort, supra note 19, at 980; see also 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(g) (West Supp. 2008) (describing what
steps must be taken in order for a fiduciary to provide financial advice to plan participants). A valid computer
model must "appl[y] generally accepted investment theories," take into account "relevant information about the
participant" to "prescribe[ ] objective criteria to provide asset allocation portfolios comprised of investment
options available under the plan," avoid bias towards "investments offered by the fiduciary adviser or a person
with a material affiliation or contractual relationship with the fiduciary adviser," and ensure that participants'
assets are "not inappropriately weighted with respect to any investment option." 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(g)(3)(B).
126. See In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 420 F.3d 231, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2005) (reasoning that
losses suffered by individual plaintiffs do not foreclose on the possibility that a defendant breached its ERISA
duties to the pension plan).
127. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1107(a)(3)(A) (West 1999).
128. See id. § I 107(b)(1) ("Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any acquisition or holding of
qualifying employer securities or qualifying employer real property by an eligible individual account plan.").
129. ERISA Section 404(c) Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(a)(1) (2008).
130. Id. § 2550.404c-l(b).
131. See, e.g., Nelson v. IPALCO Enters., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1096 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
Plaintiffs contend that the defendants breached the ERISA fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence
in three principle ways. First, plaintiffs contend that the defendants breached their duties by failing
to remove IPALCO and then AES stock as investment options for Thrift Plan members. Second,
plaintiffs contend that the defendants breached their duties by promoting investments in IPALCO
and AES and by failing to disclose their own sales of all or nearly all of their own IPALCO and AES
stock.
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employers offer company stock as an investment option for a defined
contribution plan, there is a rebuttable presumption that the employer has acted in
accordance with ERISA's fiduciary duties.' As the court explained in Graden v.
Conexant Systems, Inc., when a plaintiff alleges an employer breached its
fiduciary duties by offering its stock as a pension plan investment option, there
are three possible standards of review a court may apply.'33 First, "[w]here the
plan requires investment in a particular stock, the fiduciary's conduct is not
subject to judicial review."' 34 Yet, "where the plan merely permits investment in a
particular stock, the fiduciary's investment decision is subject to de novo
review." 3 5
The court in Moench v. Robertson established the third standard of review,
stating that "an [employee stock ownership plan] fiduciary who invests the assets
in employer stock is entitled to a presumption that it acted consistently with
ERISA by virtue of that decision."'' 36 Other circuits have expanded the holding in
Moench, applying the standard to 401(k) plans and other eligible individual
account plans.'37
The Moench presumption is applied when "the fiduciary is 'not absolutely
required to invest in employer securities,' but is 'more than simply permitted to
make such investments."' '  In order to rebut the Moench presumption, a plaintiff
must not only allege a sharp decline in the price of the employer's stock, but also
that:
Id. In order to make out a claim that the defendant breached its fiduciary duties by offering its stock as an
investment option, the plaintiff does not need to prove that the defendant was dishonest. Id. at 1096-97.
Ultimately, the court will analyze whether offering the defendant's stock as an investment option was a breach
of fiduciary duty by applying the Moench presumption and by evaluating whether the defendant viewed the
stock "as an appropriate and suitable investment option ..... Id. at 1099.
132. E.g., Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1115 (1996).
133. 574 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462-63 (D.N.J. 2008).
134. Id. at 462 (citing Moench, 62 F.3d at 571).
135. Id. The Graden court evaluated one of the defendant's pension plans (referred to as the "Amended
Plan"), which did not require the employer's stock to be offered as an investment option under the Moench
presumption. Id. at 463-64. The Graden court determined that the plaintiffs, who alleged that the defendants
knew or should have known that the business was facing financial troubles, stated sufficient facts for the court
to dismiss the defendants' 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. at 464.
136. Moench, 62 F.3d at 571.
137. Graden, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 463 (citing Edgar v. Avaya, Inc., 503 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2007)); see
also In re Radioshack Corp. ERISA Litig., 547 F. Supp. 2d 606, 613 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (citing Langbecker v.
Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 476 F.3d 299, 308 & n.19 (5th Cir. 2007)) (stating that the Fifth Circuit has adopted the
Third Circuit's reasoning in regards to Moench). However, not all circuits have adopted the Moench
presumption. See In re Fremont Gen. Corp. Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting In re
Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2008)) ("[T]his Circuit has not yet adopted the Moench
presumption ... and we decline to do so now."). Instead, the Ninth Circuit looks at a number of factors to
determine if an employer breached its fiduciary duties by offering the employer's stock as a defined
contribution plan investment option, including whether "a company's stock was artificially inflated by an illegal
scheme about which the fiduciaries knew or should have known." Fremont General, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1158.
138. Graden, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 462-63 (quoting Moench, 62 F.3d at 571).
2010 /Reforming 401(k) Pensions
[The] defendant[] [knew] of the stock's "impending collapse" and the
defendants' "own conflicted status" created the type of "dire situation" in
which the defendants should have disobeyed the plan's direction to make
employer stock an investment option or divested the plan of company
stock in order to fulfill their fiduciary obligation to the plan and its
participants. 39
Some courts, without expressly adopting the Moench presumption, have applied
a similar approach to determine whether an employer should have removed its
stock as a pension plan investment option.'40
III. PROBLEMS WITH 401 (K) PLANS
A. Employee Needs That Must Be Addressed
1. Employees Face Danger by Placing Both Immediate and Long-Term
Financial Dependence upon the Employer
Financial experts recommend that employees invest no more than ten percent
of their pensions in a single company. 14' Employees who invest in their
employer's stock have a stake in the company greater than that held by other
investors-employees are reliant upon the employer for their paychecks, and
often other benefits, such as health care.44 As a result, employees who invest
heavily in their employer's stock are faced with the possibility of losing both
their jobs and their retirement funds. 43 For example, in 1963, the Studebaker
Corporation closed one of its factories, resulting in almost 10,000 workers losing
their jobs.'44 Compounding matters, nearly 4,000 of those workers lost eighty-five
139. Id. at 463 (quoting Edgar v. Avaya, Inc., 503 F.3d 340, 348 (3d Cir. 2007)). The Graden court
evaluated a second pension plan provided by one of the defendants (referred to as the "Former Plan") under the
Moench presumption. Id. at 463-64. Under this standard, the Graden court held that allegations that the
defendants knew that the employer's stock price was likely to drop, and that certain corporate officers acted to
conceal this fact from the plaintiffs, was not sufficient to overcome the Moench presumption. Id.
140. See Sherrill v. Federal-Mogul Corp. Ret. Programs Comm., 413 F. Supp. 2d 842, 859 (E.D. Mich.
2006).
Plaintiffs' allegations go beyond simply suggesting that the Retirement Committee failed to override
the terms of the Plan. Indeed, [the plaintiffs] allege that the Retirement Committee, as Plan
fiduciaries, failed to take any action that might protect participants' assets in the Plan. These
allegations of failing to take action may ... reveal factual background relating to the Retirement
Committee's discretionary acts of plan management or administration that would come within the
scope of an ERISA fiduciary duty.
Id.
141. O'Hare, supra note 16, at 1220; see also Benartzi et al., supra note 13, at 47 ("Encouraging or
forcing employees to invest in a single stock, rather than a diversified fund such as a mutual fund, violates the
first principle of investing--to diversify!").
142. Kaplan, supra note 15, at 76.
143. id.; Reece, supra note 12, at 70.
144. Reece, supra note 12, at 69.
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percent of their pension benefits in the wake of the factory closure.' 45 This is a
scenario that ERISA was intended to prevent.' 6
Under existing law, however, the use of 401(k) plans can lead to similar
tragedies. For example, at the time of Enron's collapse, sixty-two percent of the
assets in the company's 401(k) plan consisted of Enron stock.'4 7 Enron's
employees not only lost their source of immediate income, but also much of their
retirement savings. 48 Even though nearly four decades separated the collapses of
Studebaker and Enron, both companies' employees suffered largely the same
fate. 1
4 9
Exacerbating the problem is the fact that the courts have truncated many
ERISA protections that would guard against workers over-investing in their
employers. 5° For example, the Izzarelli court essentially gave employers the
ability to make self-dealing changes to defined contribution plans, so long as the
plans receive some sort of incidental benefit. 5' Since the employer only needs to
act for the benefit of the plan as a whole, any subgroups who may be harmed by
the employer's self-interested changes would not have a right of action for
ERISA violations.
52
Furthermore, employees bear a heavy burden in proving that the employer
should not have provided its stock as an investment option. Plaintiffs must
demonstrate that the poor results of investing in the employer's stock were
foreseeable. 53 Even if this initial showing is met, the Moench presumption sets a
very high pleading bar for aggrieved plaintiffs.'4 In Graden, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants knew that the employer's stock price was likely to drop and
that corporate directors acted to conceal that fact from the pension plan
145. Id.
146. Id. at 72.
147. Benartzi et al., supra note 13, at 45.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Reece, supra note 12, at 69 (stating the effects of Studebaker's factory closure on its
employees); Benartzi et al., supra note 13, at 45 (describing the effects of Enron's collapse on its employees).
150. See Izzarelli v. Rexene Prods. Co., 24 F.3d 1506, 1524 (5th Cir. 1994) (limiting the scope of
activities that would trigger an employer's ERISA fiduciary duties); see also Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d
553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that ESOP fiduciaries are entitled to a presumption that they acted in
accordance with ERISA's fiduciary requirements when offering employer stock as an investment option).
151. See Izzarelli, 24 F.3d at 1523 (citing Deak v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 821 F.2d 572,
579-81 & n.12 (11 th Cir. 1987)) (stating that employers should not be allowed to legitimize self-dealing by
providing an incidental benefit to the pension plan). The Izzarelli court declined to follow the approach used by
the Deak court; instead the Izzarelli court restricted the scope of fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA. Id. at
1523-25.
152. See id. at 1523 ("[A] fiduciary's duty 'runs to the plan as a whole,' not to any individual
beneficiary or group of beneficiaries.").
153. See, e.g., Nelson v. IPALCO Enters., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1099 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (reasoning
that an employer cannot be held liable if one could have viewed the employer's stock as "as an appropriate and
suitable investment option").
154. See Graden v. Conexant Sys., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463 (D.N.J. 2008) (stating that a plaintiff
must show the employer's stock is facing "impending collapse," and that the employer was acting out of self-
interest in offering its stock as a defined contribution plan investment option).
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participants.'-" However, these facts were not sufficient to demonstrate the sort of
"dire situation" that would overcome the Moench presumption.1
5 6
2. Employees Generally Lack Financial Knowledge
Given that participants in 401(k) pension plans are responsible for making
their own investments, it is crucial that participants have some investment
expertise."' Yet, in general, the American public lacks the financial knowledge to
make sound investment decisions."' Numerous studies have revealed that the vast
majority of employees fail to realize that investing in their employer's stock is
riskier than assembling a diversified pension portfolio. 59 Even after Enron's
collapse, the majority of employees believe that investing in their employer's
stock is less risky, or is equally as risky, as investing in a diversified stock
fund.' 6
Furthermore, American culture tends to focus on short-term results. 6'
According to one study, which examined, among other things, how different
societies value long-term orientation characteristics, such as thrift, against short-
term orientation characteristics, such as an expectation for quick results, found
that "the United States ranks relatively low on the scale of long-term orientation,
tending to be more short-term."'162 This implies that Americans may be vulnerable
to making short-term investments with their retirement accounts and
consequently failing to plan for long-term security.1
63
155. Id. at 463-64.
156. Id.
157. Susan Griffith, How Does America Score on Financial Knowledge? Case Professor to Discuss
GAO's National Financial Literacy Forum, CASE W. RES. U. NEWS CENTER, July 29, 2004, http://www.
case.edu/news/2004/7-04/previts-gao forum.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
158. id.; see also Young Americans Center for Financial Education, Financial Literacy Statistics,
http://www.yacenter.org/index.cfm?fuseAction=financialLiteracyStatistics.financialLiteracyStatistics (last
visited Mar. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Financial Literacy Statistics] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(reporting that "[o]f the 6,000 students who took the Jump$tart personal finance survey in 2006, 62% received
failing scores with 60% being the lowest passing grade").
159. Benartzi et al., supra note 13, at 53 ("For example, John Hancock Financial Services (1999) reports
that only [eighteen] percent of employees realize that their employer's stock is riskier than a stock fund.").
160. See id. at 54 (reporting that twenty-five percent of respondents stated that investing in the
employer's stock is less risky than investing in a diversified stock fund, and thirty-nine percent of respondents
stated that investing in the employer's stock is equally as risky as investing in a diversified stock fund).
161. Muir, supra note 17, at 4-5 (noting that the United States placed twenty-seventh out of thirty-four
countries examined).
162. Id.
163. See Franklin Templeton Investments, Why Diversify, http://www.franklintempleton.ca/ca/retail/
en/jsp-cm/education/life planning/why-diversify.jsp (last visited Mar. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Why Diversify]
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("For investors to achieve their investment goals, a steadfast focus on
long-term investment goals is required. Making changes to a portfolio in response to market movements can be
costly; thinking in the short term can cause investors to miss out on the gains when the markets bounce back-
and the markets always bounce back.").
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3. Employees Are Vulnerable to Being Misled by Their Employer's
Fraudulent Representations
While companies typically communicate with their investors through public
correspondence, employers can communicate investment information about the
company's stock to its employees through a number of informal methods,
including company newsletters, staff meetings, internal memoranda, and
emails. '64 These types of communications "are not required to be filed with the
SEC.' 65 Since these informal communications are not publicly disclosed, the
employer's representations of its stock's stability will not be scrutinized by
analysts or journalists., 66
Without public scrutiny, an employer that makes misleading statements
about the company's stock to its employees through informal forms of
communication is unlikely to be subject to discipline.' 67 Attorneys who specialize
in securities litigation often review press releases for misleading statements;
since informal forms of communication are not made publicly available, these
attorneys would never be aware of when misleading statements were made.
'68
Furthermore, because informal communications are not disclosed to the SEC,
there is no chance that the Commission would bring an action against an
employer that makes misleading statements to its employees. '69
Additionally, employees are likely to trust representations made by their
employer.' 70 Due to employees' predisposition to trust their employer,
representations about the employer's stock will likely be taken at face value.'
7
'
Finally, people tend to comply with the wishes of authority figures.' 72 As
employees are reliant upon their employer for their livelihood, employees have a
large incentive to comply with their employer's wishes and recommendations.
For these reasons, employees are more vulnerable than the general public to the
employer's misrepresentations.
164. O'Hare, supra note 16, at 1224.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1225.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. O'Hare, supra note 16, at 1227.
171. Id. at 1225.
172. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 49-50 (1974)
(describing the behaviors of a subject who believed that he was administering painful electrical shocks to
another research participant).
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B. Employer Interests That Must Be Addressed
1. Cost Effectiveness
Section 401(k) pension plans have become more popular among employers
because these types of plans are less expensive to administer than traditional
pension plans.' A 401(k) plan can be especially cost effective when the plan
consists of the employer's stock. 74 For instance:
A corporation is allowed to deduct the full market value of stock that it
contributes to the employees' 401(k) plan, even though the corporation's
out-of-pocket cost is trivial or nonexistent. Furthermore, dividends paid
on such stock are usually not deductible, but when these shares are held
in a 401(k) plan, the dividends become a deductible expense."'
Because a 401(k) plan's success is determined by the participant's ability to
make sound investments, 401(k) plans can achieve maximum productivity from
the workers with minimum financial contributions from the employers. 76
In light of the financial crisis this nation faces, a cost-effective pension plan
is a particularly important consideration.' Recently, pension plans have suffered
173. See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 62-63.
There are several reasons for this shift from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans,
including (1) absence of [Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation] premiums, (2) no actuarial
expenses, (3) fewer compliance costs due to less burdensome regulations, and (4) the structural
transformation of the American economy from unionized manufacturing companies to service sector
operations and high technology enterprises.
Id. at 63. In light of the economic crisis, the ability to fund a pension plan with corporate stock instead of cash
may be especially attractive. See, e.g., Eleanor Laise, Despite Risks, Workers Guzzle Company Stock, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 5, 2009, at DI ("In an effort to conserve cash, International Paper Co. this month began making 401(k)
matching contributions in company stock rather than cash.").
174. See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 74 (stating that an employer can receive tax benefits when its
employees' 401(k) plan is funded with the employer's stock). But see Benartzi et al., supra note 13, at 62
(arguing that in lieu of issuing stock directly to its employees, the employer could issue stock to the market,
then use the capital raised to fund the pension plan). Additionally, many employers do not issue new stock to
their employees; instead, employers tend to purchase stock from the open market and then subsequently issue
the purchased stock to the employees. Id.
175. Kaplan, supra note 15, at 74.
176. See Schmall, supra note 11, at 932 (arguing that when a participant's pension investments under-
perform, the employer would receive a windfall, in that the employer has benefitted from optimal production,
yet the employee has not received any monetary gain); see also Benartzi et al., supra note 13, at 66 (stating that
there are three outcomes than can result from employees heavily investing in their employer's stock: (1) the
employees could realize spectacular gains, (2) the employees could suffer spectacular losses, or (3) "participants
take significant positions in their employers' stock, and their retirement savings are worth less than they seem
(on average, 50 cents on the dollar) because of the inherently higher volatility of individual stocks").
177. See Mary Williams Walsh, After Losses, Pensions Ask for a Change, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at
B 1 (reporting that, due to the fact that many companies are currently facing a cash shortage, these companies
are pushing for new laws that would lessen the amount of money that must be placed in pension funds).
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staggering losses. 78 Any expenditure used to administer a pension plan would
mean that the company would not have access to funds needed to stabilize the
company.'79 For instance, if a company does not have enough cash on hand to pay
its employees, it would have to institute layoffs. Laying off employees in order to
maintain pension funds smacks of irony.
2. Increased Motivation, Loyalty, and Benefits to the Corporate Directors
Employee ownership of employer stock is most often justified as a way to
increase employee motivation and productivity. '0' Additionally, employees who
own shares of their employer's stock may be more likely to have a favorable
view of management and may be more willing to go along with management's
future plans for the company.'8 ' A final consideration is that "additional
purchases of the corporate employer's stock support that stock's market price.',
8 2
Higher stock prices benefit the corporation, and particularly the corporate
directors, in several ways. First, high stock values can aid a corporation merging
with another, since in certain circumstances, corporate stock is used to purchase
the target company, or stock is sold to raise the capital needed to go forward with
the merger.'83 Second, high stock prices add value to any stock options the
corporate directors may hold. '84 Finally, high stock prices can provide job
security to corporate directors, since high stock prices could make it more
difficult for other corporations to acquire the company.'" The more difficult it is
for a company to be acquired, the less likely it is that the company will actually
be acquired and its incumbent directors replaced.
In sum, there are three main problems with the existing 401(k) pension
system: it allows for employees to over-invest in the employer's stock;'
8 6
178. See id. ("The total value of company pension funds is thought to have fallen by more than $250
billion since last winter.").
179. See id. ("[Wlhen Congress tightened the pension rules it did not take this year's unprecedented
market turmoil into account. If companies are now required to put new money into their pension funds, they
say, they will not have the cash needed for business investments and payrolls.").
180. Benartzi et al., supra note 13, at 57. However, whether worker ownership of the employer's stock
actually increases productivity is questionable. Id. According to what is called the "I/N problem," even if a low-
level worker for a large corporation was to increase her productivity to reap the benefits of owning her
employer's stock, the worker's efforts would have an extremely small effect on the employer's overall
performance. Id. Additionally, there is little empirical evidence to support the proposition that worker
ownership of the employer's stock increases productivity. Id.
181. See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 75 ("Giving employees a direct stake in the ownership of a business
may align the interests of employees and company stockholders in other ways as well.").
182. Id. at 73.
183. Id. at 74.
184. Id. at 73.
185. See id. at 74 ("[Hlaving employees hold portions of a company's stock provides a source of
stockholder stability should some other company try to acquire it.").
186. See supra Part III.A. I and accompanying text (discussing the fact that pension participants tend to
over-invest in the employer's stock as part of their 401(k) plans).
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employees generally lack the financial knowledge needed to manage their
pension investments; 87  and employees are especially vulnerable to any
misrepresentations their employer may make about its stock. ' While 401(k)
pensions must be reformed to address these issues, any offered reform must be
cost effective'89 and must align the interests of both the participants and the
company.' 90 The proposals this Comment puts forward strike an appropriate
balance by protecting 401(k) participants while avoiding excessive burdens upon
employers.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. In Order to Qualify Under Section 401(k), a Pension Plan Must Have a
Diversification Plan
Employees, like the American public in general, suffer from a lack of
financial education. ' Without a working understanding of finances or access to a
financial planner, 401(k) participants will not receive optimal returns on their
investments."2 If employees do not have faith in the soundness of 401(k) plans as
retirement funds, employees may stop participating in these plans. 93
The Department of the Treasury has advocated reforming 401(k) pension
plans by favoring "government policies [that] promote the ability of employees
to make informed, educated decisions about how they wish to allocate their
assets."' 94 One commentator has advocated that, as a condition for offering a
defined contribution plan, employers must also offer employees individualized,
independent financial advice.' 9 Another commentator has proposed requiring
employers to provide a "default" investment plan, which participants are free to
change and which would be sufficiently diversified. 96 Although both proposals
187. See supra Part I1I.A.2 and accompanying text (discussing the public's financial literacy).
188. See supra Part III.A.3 and accompanying text (discussing how representations made to employees
via intra-office communications are not scrutinized by objective third parties).
189. See supra Part II.B. I and accompanying text (discussing cost considerations that employers must
account for when offering a pension plan).
190. See Part mH.B.2 and accompanying text (discussing how 401(k) plans help to increase employee
productivity).
191. Griffith, supra note 157; see also Financial Literacy Statistics, supra note 158.
192. Griffith, supra note 157.
193. Schmall, supra note 11, at 932; see also Lawrence, supra note 18, at 73 ("Transferring investment
decisions and risks to participants who lack the financial acuity to make informed decisions is a recipe for
disaster.").
194. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON EMPLOYER
STOCK iN 401(K) PLANS, at 7 (2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/401 (k).pdf.
195. Lawrence, supra note 18, at 73. Professor Lawrence reasons that individually tailored investment
advice would give participants the ability to make sound investments, as well as help counteract any coercive
influence an employer may exert over a participant's investment decisions. Id.
196. Befort, supra note 19, at 981-82. Professor Befort argues that "[m]any participants are less-than-
savvy investors who tend to think that company stock concentrations are a problem for others, but not
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would be beneficial, it is important to note that pension plans are voluntarily
provided by employers.'97 Therefore, Congress must strike the right balance of
providing employee protections without deterring employers from offering
pension plans.' 98
This Comment argues that the best solution is to revise section 401(k) of the
IRC to require qualified plans to contain a diversification component. This
revision is in line with the common recommendations that an employee invest no
more than ten percent of her pension into a single company '99 and that an
investment portfolio consist of holdings from diverse classes of businesses20
"[D]iversification across a number of asset classes ensures that a portfolio
benefits from exposure to today's outperforming asset classes while
simultaneously reducing the downward drag on overall returns linked to asset
classes that might underperform today, but could well outperform tomorrow."' '
Taking these steps helps to ensure that a portfolio is insulated from the harms of
202
market volatility, while maximizing the chances of showing strong returns.
Adding a diversification requirement to section 401(k) would bring this
provision in line with similar existing laws. For example, ERISA imposes a duty
to diversify upon pension plan fiduciaries. 23 This requirement recognizes that
diversification "may protect against adverse business conditions, imprudence, or
dishonesty in a particular field and minimize the risk of large losses. ' '204 Since
401(k) plans are meant to give participants control over their investment assets,205
it would be inappropriate to command participants to diversify their assets.
However, pension plan fiduciaries are permitted to give investment advice to
participants. 206 It would not be a drastic measure for Congress to go a step further
themselves." Id. at 980-81. Also, allowing employers to give participants investment advice may open the door
for employers to act out of self-interest, instead of for the benefit of the participants. See id. at 981 (stating that
allowing employers to give participants investment advice "runs counter to ERISA's general prohibited
transaction rules that bar parties with conflicts of interest from exercising fiduciary responsibilities").
197. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 194, at 1.
198. Lawrence, supra note 18, at 71.
199. O'Hare, supra note 16, at 1220.
200. See Why Diversify, supra note 163 ("Key to minimizing portfolio risk are discipline and
diversification.").
201. Id.; see also Note, Fiduciary Standards and the Prudent Man Rule Under the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 HARV. L. REV. 960, 971 (1975) ("By then dividing his assets
between [a high-risk, high-return] portfolio and a portfolio of risk-free investments, the investor can reach his
desired level of risk for the entire portfolio." (internal citation omitted)).
202. Why Diversify, supra note 163.
203. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(l)(C) (West 1999).
204. Brock v. Citizens Bank of Clovis, No. Civ. 83-1054 BB, 1985 WL 71535, *2 (D.N.M. Dec. 20,
1985) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
205. See ERISA Section 404(c) Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(a)(1) (2008) (stating that ERISA's
fiduciary duties will be excused if "a participant or beneficiary is considered to have exercised independent
control over the assets in his account"); see also Klaas, supra note 90, at 803 (stating that 401(k) plans were
intended to allow participants to realize larger returns than the average defined benefit plan).
206. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(g) (West Supp. 2008) (specifying the guidelines that must be followed in
order to create an "eligible investment advice arrangement").
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and require that employers give some form of investment advice to 401(k)
participants.
Furthermore, 401(k) plans receive substantial tax exemptions.20 7 Therefore,
the American public has an interest in how 401(k) plans are governed.2 8 Rather
than give employers nearly unbridled discretion as to how their 401(k) plan will
operate, Congress should require that these plans be operated with a minimum
level of emphasis put on prudent, careful investing. Reckless investing is one of
the causes of the economic woes that plagued the United States in 2008.209 Rather
than waiting until public funding is needed to keep an industry viable, Congress
should enact proactive measures to ensure that extreme economic calamity does
not completely decimate 401(k) plans.
Finally, 401(k) plans are attractive to employers because such pension plans
are cost effective.20 One may argue that modifying 401(k) pensions to mandate a
particular type of diversification program may dissuade the employer from
offering a pension plan, as the mandated diversification program may be aburdnso e cot fr apartculr " 211
burdensome cost for a particular employer. Yet, there are currently stringent
requirements regarding what constitutes a "qualified default investment
alternative" for the purpose of automatic 401(k) investments. 2'2 Furthermore, the
law permits employers to charge employees for the investment advice
• 213
provided. In light of these facts, requiring 401(k) plans to contain a
diversification component would not be unduly burdensome upon employers.
207. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 404(a)(3) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008) (describing the amount of tax deductions
an employer can claim for contributing to a defined contribution account); see also id. § 402(a) (exempting
funds placed in a 401(k) plan from taxation until the funds are distributed to the participant).
208. See Lawrence, supra note 18, at 47.
Given the fact that the federal government is providing billions of dollars in tax breaks to
qualified retirement plan sponsors and participants, and that all Americans, including those that do
not reap the benefits of qualified retirement plan coverage, are paying higher taxes to subsidize
forgone revenues, federal tax policy discredits the argument that [defined contribution] plan assets
belong solely to the respective participants and that investment decisions are their private financial
decisions.
Id.; see also Kaplan, supra note 15, at 80 ("The public ... has a major interest in the financial soundness of
[tax-subsidized retirement plan] arrangements.").
209. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5211 (West Supp. 2009) (empowering the Secretary of Treasury "to make and
fund commitments to purchase . . . troubled assets from any financial institution"). "Troubled assets" are
defined as mortgages or any other "financial instrument[s]" that the Secretary of Treasury determines must be
purchased in order to promote financial security. Id. § 5202(9).
210. See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 62-63 (stating that for several reasons, "including (1) absence of
[Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation] premiums, (2) no actuarial expenses, [and] (3) fewer compliance costs
due to less burdensome regulations," employers have come to favor defined contribution plans over defined
benefit plans).
211. See id. at 63.
212. See Fiduciary Relief for Investments in Qualified Default Investment Alternatives, 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.404c-5(e) (2008) (specifying the minimum requirements for a qualified default investment plan).
213. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(g)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2008) (defining an eligible investment advice
arrangement as a plan that "provides that any fees (including any commission or other compensation) received
by the fiduciary adviser for investment advice or with respect to the sale, holding, or acquisition of any security
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1. Plans That Would Qualify Under the Diversification Component
There are three general approaches that would satisfy the diversification
component. The first framework is a plan that would provide individualized
investment advice to plan participants. This framework is similar to what
Professor Janice Kay Lawrence has proposed.2 4 According to Professor
Lawrence's approach, "[plension reform must also include measures mandating
employer-facilitated individually-tailored investment advice as a condition of
ERISA Section 404(c) fiduciary liability relief."2 5 Permissible variations of this
framework may include regularly scheduled group investment seminars or
providing participants with financial experts' contact information.
The second framework would provide a diversified default investment plan
for all participants. Professor Stephen F. Befort has argued that requiring
employers to provide a diversified default portfolio, which participants can
modify if they choose to do so, would effectively nullify the participants'
investment "inertia., 21 6 This framework should also allow for a plan in which the
employer offers a variety of pre-determined investment plans with varying levels
of risk.
The third type of framework that would satisfy the diversification component
would be a plan in which the employer provides an incentive to participants to
maintain diversified 401(k) portfolios. For example, under this framework, the
employer may only provide matching contributions to employees meeting
diversification standards. Somewhat similar to how ERISA provides tax
incentives so advantageous that it would be irrational for a company not to
comply with ERISA's provisions,2 7  this framework would promote
diversification by providing incentives that would make it irrational for a
participant not to diversify her assets. The third framework, like the other two,
would thus strike the appropriate balance between giving participants the
autonomy to make their own investment choices and ensuring that the
participants are making sound financial decisions.
2. Mechanics of a Diversification Component
The primary issue in establishing a diversification component is determining
what would be needed in order to satisfy the requirement. It must be noted that
or other property for purposes of investment of plan assets do not vary depending on the basis of any investment
option selected").
214. Lawrence, supra note 18, at 73.
215. Id.
216. Befort, supra note 19, at 981-82; see also James J. Choi et al., Are Empowerment and Education
Enough? Underdiversification in 401(k) Plans, 2005 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcIVITY 151, 154 (2005)
(stating that 401(k) plans could be reformed by "giv[ing] firms incentives to adopt socially optimal default
choices").
217. ROTHsTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, at 1162.
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section 401(k) of the IRC tends to set flexible standards, supplemented with
examples of plans that may meet those standards. 2 s As the financial goals and
needs of plan participants vary wildly, employers should be given a great deal of
latitude to tailor their 401(k) plans to meet their employees' needs."19
Existing law should be the touchstone for what is required to satisfy the
diversification component. For instance, the Secretary of Labor has promulgated
a regulation specifying what is required of a qualified default investment
alternative."O These specifications should be used to judge whether a default
investment plan satisfies the diversification component. Similarly, an investment
advice program must be based on a generally accepted computer model.22' This
requirement should be implemented to provide a basis for determining whether
an employer's individual advice given to plan participants is based on
sufficiently diversified recommendations.
Finally, the diversification component should not be viewed as a
governmental edict on how participants must invest their 401(k) assets. Instead,
participants should be able to deviate from the diversified plan as long as there is
informed written consent.222 Informed written consent is an important safeguard
against fiduciaries not acting in the interest of the beneficiaries.22 ' Therefore, a
participant should be allowed to deviate from the safety of the established
diversification plan, so long as the participant is informed of and consents to the
risks presented by the deviation.
218. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(k)(l 1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008) (describing a plan that would meet
nondiscrimination requirements).
219. See Choi et al., supra note 216, at 154 (stating that it is difficult to establish universal 401(k)
default investments, due to the fact that employees face a wide variety of economic circumstances); cf Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (reasoning that, because "judges are not business experts," it
is inappropriate for courts to second-guess the business decisions made by a corporate board of directors).
220. Fiduciary Relief for Investments in Qualified Default Investment Alternatives, 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.404c-5(e) (2008).
221. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(g)(3)(B) (West Supp. 2008).
222. See Befort, supra note 19, at 981-82 ("Employees could override the default option and change the
investment mix to include company stock if it is offered by the plan as an investment option. Under this
approach, employees could consciously choose to invest in company stock, but the impact of inertia, a definite
force in determining investment allocations, would work in favor of diversification." (internal citations
omitted)).
223. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.8(a) (2008) (requiring that, before a lawyer can enter
into a business transaction with her client, the lawyer must, inter alia, get the client's "informed consent, in a
writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction"). Informed consent can include the lawyer
having to explain to the client the material risks the client faces when entering into the business transaction. Id.
at R. 1.8 cmt. 2. This rule recognizes that "[a] lawyer's legal skill and training, together with the relationship of
trust and confidence between lawyer and client, create the possibility of overreaching when the lawyer
participates in a business, property, or financial transaction with a client." Id. at R. 1.8 cmt. 1.
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B. 401(k) Assets Should Not Include the Employer's Stock
Adding a diversification component to section 401(k) of the IRC is necessary
in order to address the fact that many plan participants fail to adequately manage
224 titheir 401(k) assets. Yet, this reform does not address the fact that plan
participants tend to view their employer's stock as being a much better
investment than it actually is.225 One group of researchers studied whether media
coverage on the collapses of Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing would lead
to 401(k) participants investing less heavily in their employer's stock.226 The
researchers found that the media coverage resulted in little change in
participants' investing strategies.227 In fact, the researchers found some evidence
that the media coverage actually lead to participants investing more heavily in the
employer's stock.22s Therefore, adding a diversification component is not a
complete solution to the problems facing 401(k) participants-a second
safeguard must be put in place.
The research on media coverage and investing strategies raises two issues:
why do participants view their employer's stock in such an irrational manner, and
what reforms are needed in order to ensure that participants do not over-invest in
their employer's stock? As to the first issue, this Comment argues that
participants hold an irrational view of their employer's stock because participants
are unable to separate their role as an "employee" from their role as an
"investor." To support this theory, this Comment focuses on the individual works
of Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo.
As to the second issue, this Comment argues that section 401(k) of the IRC
should be amended so that the employer's stock cannot make up any portion of a
401(k) plan. At times, a participant's role as an "employee" can lead the
participant to make decisions that are personally disadvantageous.229 Due to the
danger that participants face when they include the employer's stock in 401(k)
assets, and because psychological forces make it difficult for participants to
handle the employer's stock in a financially responsible manner, an outright ban
224. See Befort, supra note 19, at 976 ("Many employees, faced with application forms and a dizzying
array of investment options, simply procrastinate and do nothing. The complexity of the financial planning task,
in other words, results in 'bounded rationality' and a sub-optimal process of retirement planning."); see also
Choi et al., supra note 216, at 153-54 ("Households typically behave passively, following the path of least
resistance.").
225. See Choi et al., supra note 216, at 192 ("[E]mpowering employees to trade out of employer stock
and educating them about the risks of employer stock will have only a small effect on 401(k) employer stock
holdings.").
226. Id. at 153.
227. Id. at 192-93.
228. Id. at 181-82.
229. See Andrew A. Luchak et al., When Do Committed Employees Retire? The Effects of
Organizational Commitment on Retirement Plans Under a Defined-Benefit Pension Plan, 47 HuM. RES. MGMT.
581, 594 (2008) (finding that certain characteristics correlate with employees choosing to retire after it is most
optimal to do so).
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on allowing 401(k) plans to hold the employer's stock is needed. This ban serves
as the additional safeguard that is needed to meet the diversification component's
shortcomings.
1. Social Psychology Provides a Framework That Explains Why 401(k)
Participants Overvalue Their Employer's Stock
Commentators have put forward several theories explaining why participants
over-invest in their employer's stock.230 However, these theories seem to view
plan participants as independent actors, while largely ignoring that situational
forces also affect how participants operate. In other words, the fact that a plan
participant is primarily an "employee" for the employer sponsoring the plan may
cloud the participant's judgment when it comes to acting as an "investor."23'
Two classic psychological experiments demonstrate that situational forces
can dramatically influence individual behavior. Stanley Milgram's obedience
experiments studied the willingness of a person to harm another individual if
someone in a position of authority instructed the person to do So.232 An
"experimenter" told the subjects that they would be participating in an
experiment studying how punishment affects learning.233 The experiment's
administrator instructed the subjects to read a series of word pairs to a "learner,"
to ask the learner to recall which words should be paired, and to administer an
electric shock to the learner if he did not answer correctly.23 Subjects were told to
increase the shock's intensity for each incorrect answer the learner gave.2" The
intensity of the shock ranged from 15 to 450 volts.
236
In reality, the "learner" was not actually receiving any electrical shock from
the subject.217 The learner's role in Professor Milgram's experiments was to
intentionally give wrong answers, then react to reflect the appropriate level of
238pain that would be expected from the shock intensity being administered. As
the shocks increased in intensity, the learner would cry out in pain, insist that he
230. See, e.g., O'Hare, supra note 16, at 1221 (stating that employees may overinvest in their
employer's stock, because an employee may view the employer's stock as a sound investment, out of loyalty,
due to peer pressure, or because of encouragement from senior management).
231. Cf. Philip G. Zimbardo, Revising the Stanford Prison Experiment: A Lesson in the Power of
Situation, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 30, 2007, at B6 (arguing that in the criminal justice context, situational
forces should be used to explain a defendant's mens rea).
232. MILGRAM, supra note 172, at 13-14.
233. Id. at 17-18.
234. Id. at 19-21.
235. Id. at 20.
236. Id. (explaining that the "generator" had verbal markings indicating shock intensity as well, from
"Slight Shock" to "XXX").
237. Id. at 24.
238. MILGRAM, supra note 172, at 22-23.
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did not want to participate anymore, and eventually stop giving verbal feedback
at all (as if to simulate that the learner passed out from the pain, or worse). 39
Surveyed psychiatrists, college students, and laypersons all predicted that
subjects would go no further than administering 300 volt shocks.' These groups
predicted that "only a pathological fringe" would be willing to administer a shock
at full intensity.24' Professor Milgram actually found that up to sixty-five percent
of subjects, depending on the learner's proximity to the subject, were willing to
administer a 450-volt shock 2
The "Stanford Prison Experiment" provides an even more dramatic example
of situational forces at work than Professor Milgram's experiments, since the
participants in the prison experiment acted without any sort of prompting from
others. 3 In the "Stanford Prison Experiment," Philip Zimbardo attempted to
study how behavior is affected when "good people" are put into an "evil
situation."2" Professor Zimbardo sought to recreate a prison setting within
Stanford's psychology department office by randomly dividing twenty-four
student volunteers into two groups, guards and prisoners, with Zimbardo taking
the role of the prison's "superintendent." 245 To further add a sense of realism, the
researchers gave the prisoners identity numbers and prison smocks.246
Professor Zimbardo intended for the experiment to last for two weeks.247
However, in a matter of days, the guards began to physically, verbally, and
sexually abuse the prisoners.248 In turn, researchers had to release a number of
prisoners due the fact that these participants began suffering from extreme
stress, After just six days, the conditions of Stanford prison had become so
deplorable that Zimbardo had to terminate the experiment. °
The work of Milgram and Zimbardo helps to demonstrate how situational
forces can impact individual behavior.25' Their work is significant within the
context of 401(k) pension reform, because 401(k) participants have dual-roles:
239. Id. at 23.
240. Id. at 27-29.
241. Id. at 30-31.
242. Id. at 35-36.
243. S. Alexander Haslam & Stephen Reicher, Beyond the Banality of Evil: Three Dynamics of an
Interactionist Social Psychology of Tyranny, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 615, 616 (2007).
244. Zimbardo, supra note 231.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. Interestingly, Professor Zimbardo became so engrossed in his role as prison "superintendent"
that he initially lost sight of his duties as a psychological researcher. Id. It was not until the woman that
Zimbardo was romantically involved with threatened to end their relationship that he came to his senses. Id.
251. See Haslam & Reicher, supra note 243, at 616 (discussing the impact of Professor Milgram's and
Professor Zimbardo's work on the development of the "banality-of-evil" theory).
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that of "employee" and that of "investor." '252 For many individuals, the role of
"employee" is central to their self-image." 3 Moreover, people like to view
themselves favorably and, thus as good employees.25
In light of these facts, it seems that when it comes to the employer's stock, a
401(k) participant's role as an "employee" overrides the participant's role as
"investor." There is empirical evidence that suggests that a committed employee will
ignore the tendency to act in her own self-interest."' Thus, it seems that employees
have difficulty separating what would be advantageous for them professionally from
what would be advantageous personally. Employees tend to view the employer's
stock as being less risky than other investment types 56 While investing heavily in the
employer's stock would be irrational from the standpoint of an "investor," 251 it does
make sense from the standpoint of an "employee"--i.e., organizational loyalty and
commitment can be factors that would lead to an employee advancing within the
organization. Additionally, since people tend to view themselves as good
employees, and affective commitment is enhanced by an organization making its
employees feel that their contributions are valued and important to the success of the• •259
organization, a person making investments from an "employee's" perspective
might over-estimate the actual value of the employer's stock, since the employer's
success would reflect the employee's abilities and contributions. Applying the
preceding principles, the theory that 401(k) participants invest from an "employee"
perspective may also explain why there was such a dramatic increase in participants
investing in their employer's stock during January 2009.26
Some may argue that employees do not recognize the risk of investing in their
261employer's stock simply because of a lack of financial understanding. Indeed, the
262American public does suffer from a general lack of financial literacy. But, it is
252. Cf In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that
under ERISA, plan administrators wear "two hats"-that of an employer and that of a fiduciary).
253. DAVID G. MYERS, EXPLORING PSYCHOLOGY 131 (5th ed. 2002).
254. See MILGRAM, supra note 172, at 28-30 (explaining that people predicted that they would not
disobey the researcher's instructions to harm the learner because people want to view themselves as good).
255. See Luchak et al., supra note 229, at 594 (finding that a high level of affective commitment
correlates with employees choosing to retire after it is most optimal to do so). "Affective commitment refers to
an employee's emotional attachment to, identification with, and involvement in the organization." Id. at 585.
256. See Benartzi et al., supra note 13, at 54 (reporting that over sixty percent of respondents surveyed
stated that they felt their employer's stock was less than or just as risky as investing in a diversified stock fund).
257. Id. at 53 (stating that investing in the employer's stock is especially risky, "because [employees]
could lose their retirement funds and job at the same time"); Kaplan, supra note 15, at 78 ("The employee
already has her livelihood and health insurance tied to the employer's economic well-being. Any further
alignment of the employee's and the employer's financial interests can only be described as reckless.").
258. Cf MILGRAM, supra note 172, at 28-30.
259. Luchak et al., supra note 229, at 585.
260. Laise, supra note 173 (reporting that 401(k) participants invested more than $65 million in their
employers' stocks, despite the fact that these investors should be taking steps to diversify their holdings).
261. See Benartzi et al., supra note 13, at 53 ("[O]nly [six] percent of those with a high school education
or less recognize the risk of [investing in] company stock.").
262. Griffith, supra note 157; see also Financial Literacy Statistics, supra note 158.
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unlikely that a lack of financial knowledge is the sole reason that employees choose
to invest in their employer's stock. According to one study, education and the ability
to diversify 401(k) assets would only have a slight effect on 401(k) participant
decisions to invest in their employer's stock.163 Furthermore, empirical evidence
exists that suggests a layperson can make financial decisions comparable to those a
financial expert would make.264 Therefore, simply increasing a participant's financial
knowledge would not solve the problem created when employees invest in their
employer's stock.
In sum, situational forces seem to color how employees view investing in their
employer's stock. Similar to how Zimbardo became so engrossed in his role as
prison "superintendent" that he completely ignored his duties as a researcher,
employees seem to lose their objectivity as "investors" when it comes to their
employer's stock.'66 The situational forces of an employment relationship are largely
261internal within the employee, so restrictions on managerial behavior would not
necessarily have an impact on an employee's choice to invest in her employer's
stock. Therefore, in order to ensure that 401(k) participants operate as "investors"
and not as "employees," 401(k) plans should be forbidden from incorporating the
employer's stock.
2. Criticisms of Banning the Employer's Common Stock from the 401(k)
Portfolio
Some have argued that restrictions upon an employee's ability to invest in
the employer's stock are overly paternalistic."' One report from the U.S.
Department of the Treasury trumpets that "[t]he nation's pension system has
evolved in recent years into one that emphasizes two of the country's
quintessential values: personal responsibility and freedom of choice. 2 69 To this
end, the Department of the Treasury reasoned that "[a]rbitrary caps on employees
[sic] 401(k) investment choices challenge fundamental notions of private
property rights. 401(k) participant contributions and matching contributions are a
form of employee compensation, and government should not restrict or limit
employees [sic] ability to invest their assets as they see fit. '270 Yet, as previously
263. See Choi et al., supra note 216, at 192.
264. See Nada K. Kakabadse & Andrew Kakabadse, Prudence vs. Professionalism: Exploratory
Examination of Pension Trustee Capability, 34 PERSONNEL REV. 567, 582 (2005) (finding that pension plan
trustees without a background in finance can manage the plan at a level comparable to trustees with a
background in finance).
265. Zimbardo, supra note 231.
266. See, e.g., Benartzi et al., supra note 13, at 53; see also Laise, supra note 173.
267. See MYERS, supra note 253, at 131 (stating that, for many individuals, their profession is important
to their self-image).
268. Befort, supra note 19, at 980.
269. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 194, at 1.
270. Id. at 7.
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stated, commentators have noted that, since 401(k) plans receive tax subsidies,
the American public has a stake in how these plans are administered.,"'
Additionally, the paternalism argument presumes that participants do indeed
have the freedom of choice. But, this viewpoint ignores the fact that situational
forces pay a role in determining individual behavior."' As this Comment argues,
participants are unable to view their employer's stock in a rational manner.273 In
light of the psychological conflicts between a participant acting as an "employee"
and an "investor," it seems unrealistic to view the choice to invest in the
employer's stock as a matter of "personal responsibility and freedom of
choice. 274
Some commentators have further criticized attempts to restrict an employer's
ability to invest its stock into 401(k) plans on the grounds that the employer
would be deterred from making matching contributions or from providing any
pension fund at all. 275 However, Professor Kaplan argues that it is unlikely that an
employer would take these actions.276 Professor Kaplan notes that employers
often offer matching contributions in order to increase employee participation.277
Broad employee participation benefits the employer's directors and officers,
since it allows these individuals "to maximize their personal 401(k) plan
deferrals. '27 Furthermore, many employers may determine that a 401(k) plan
would help attract productive, qualified workers to the corporation, so even if the
employer's stock could not be offered as an investment plan, offering a pension
plan would still be worthwhile. 9
V. CONCLUSION
The past decade has demonstrated that no investment, no matter how sound it
appears, is free of risk. For example, in August 2001, Enron stock was selling at
ninety dollars per share.28° By January 2002, as a result of massive accounting
'812fraud,"' Enron stock traded at only thirty-six cents per share 282 In another
271. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text (describing the argument that the American public
has a stake in how these plans are managed, because employers receive tax incentives for pension plans).
272. See Zimbardo, supra note 231 (arguing that in the criminal justice context, situational forces should
be used to explain a defendant's mens rea).
273. See supra Part IV.B. I (describing how situational factors can impact individual behavior).
274. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 194, at 2.
275. Befort, supra note 19, at 979; see also Lawrence, supra note 18, at 49 ("[O]pponents of overall
limitations argue that employers are less likely to make employer contributions in the form of cash.").
276. Kaplan, supra note 15, at 79.
277. Id. at 79-80.
278. Id. at 80.
279. See Befort, supra note 19, at 947 (employers began using pension plans to attract and retain high-
quality employees).
280. Reece, supra note 12, at 142.
281. See id. at 94 ("Thanks to insider Sherron Watkins, the world now knows that Enron hid billions of
dollars in debts and operating losses inside private partnerships, with attractive names like 'Condor' and
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example, a $1,000 investment in Countrywide Financial made in 1982 would
have been worth $230,000 in 2003.83 Yet, in 2007, Countrywide needed a $2
billion investment from Bank of America in order to continue to offer
mortgages. 284 Over a twelve-month period, General Motor's stock value declined
by ninety percent.285 When Circuit City went out of business, it was the second-
286largest consumer electronics chain in the United States.
Experts consider the financial crisis of 2009 to be the worst since the Great
Depression. The result of the crisis is that 401(k) pension plans are in jeopardy,
and this nation is at a crossroads in determining how to respond.2 8 Congress can
institute safeguards that would help prevent pension plans from suffering the
devastating effects of a Studebaker- or Enron-type collapse. On the other hand,
Congress can wait to respond until after employees have already been harmed.8 9
Even absent specific Congressional action, society will still bear the burden of
supporting employees affected by a pension fund collapse, since a portion these
employees will likely be forced to seek public assistance.290
The 401(k) pension system is in desperate need of two reforms. First, there
must be some sort of diversification component.'9' The bull market of the 1990s,
during which everyone believed that investing in the stock market would
guarantee a profit,292 is now a distant memory. The large number of different
companies affected by the economic crisis demonstrates the need for
diversification.29 ' A diversified portfolio is the best defense against suffering
'Raptor.' The corrected financial statements reported a $1,165,000,000 overstatement of earnings for the year
2000 alone." (internal citations omitted)).
282. Reece, supra note 12, at 146.
283. Shawn Tully, Meet the 23,000% Stock for 20 Years, Countrywide Financial Has Been on a Tear;
With the Housing Boom Winding Down, Can This Mortgage Star Keep From Falling?, FORTUNE, Sept. 15,
2003, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2003/09/15/349151/index.htm.
284. Wall Street, Still a Little Wobbly, Steadies Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2007, at C2.
285. Laise, supra note 173.
286. Rosenbloom, supra note 6.
287. See Olive, supra note 7 ("As we rang in 2008, who guessed.., that all the debt-financed spending
by consumers and business over the past decade would someday culminate in the worst financial panic since the
Dirty Thirties?").
288. See Powell & Zeleny, supra note 8 (reporting that then-Senator Barack Obama had called for more
stringent regulations of the financial markets).
289. Cf 12 U.S.C.A. § 5211 (West Supp. 2009) (empowering the Secretary of Treasury to purchase
"troubled assets" in order to promote financial stability).
290. Kaplan, supra note 15, at 80.
291. See supra Part IV.A (discussing how a diversification component would rectify participants'
general lack of financial knowledge).
292. Schmall, supra note 11, at 905-06.
293. Accord Rosenbloom, supra note 6 (discussing the retail chains that the financial crisis affected);
Olive, supra note 7 (discussing the financial institutions that the financial crisis affected); see also Sommer,
supra note 2 (reporting that Dow Jones industrial average fell twenty percent during the first two months of
2009).
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large losses.294 Requiring that employers include a diversification component in
order for their pension plans to qualify under section 401(k) would adequately
guard against over-investment in a single employer.9  This requirement would
also address the concern that most participants lack the financial knowledge
needed to make sound investment choices. 96 Because this diversification
component would be a default rule, it does not take away participants' ability to
make their own investment choices.297
Additionally, the law is beginning to recognize that situational forces can
affect individual behavior.298 Situational forces should be examined in the
employment context as well. Instead of viewing an employee's decision to invest
in the employer's stock as a matter of personal choice, that action makes more
sense when viewed in light of the larger employment context. 299 The
diversification component does not reach the fact that employees may hold an
unreasonable view of the employer's stock. Therefore, in addition to adding the
diversification component, the employer's stock should be banned from
constituting a part of that employer's offered 401(k) plan. This second reform is
necessary, not because participants will not view the employer's stock
reasonably, but because participants cannot view the employer's stock
reasonably. °°
Financial security should not be reserved for the wealthy. As evidenced by
ERISA and section 401 of the IRC, Congress would like for every working
American to have a secure retirement. With modifications, 401(k) plans can be
much more secure. Secure pension funds are essential, not only to plan
beneficiaries, but to American society as a whole. The United States cannot
afford to ignore this issue any longer.
294. See Brock v. Citizens Bank of Clovis, No. Civ. 83-1054 BB, 1985 WL 71535, *2 (D.N.M. Dec. 20,
1985) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining the purpose for ERISA's duty to diversify).
295. See supra Part IV.A and accompanying text (discussing how a diversification requirement would
help protect 401 (k) participants).
296. Id.
297. See supra notes 222-23 (discussing how participants should be able to deviate from an employer's
default investment with informed consent).
298. See Zimbardo, supra note 231 (arguing that in the criminal justice context, situational forces should
be used to explain a defendant's mens rea).
299. See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing how psychological forces affect how employees view the
viability of their employer's stock).
300. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text (discussing how increased financial education alone
is ineffective at addressing how employees view their employer's stock).
